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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. WHETHER THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PROBATE COURT ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST 
ZIONS FOR FRAUD COMMITTED IN ITS CAPACITY AS PERSONAL REPRESENT-
ATIVE OF THAT ESTATE. 
2. WHETHER THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PROBATE COURT ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST 
ZIONS FOR BREACH OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS TRUSTEE OF THE JEROME 
B. PEPPER INTER VIVOS TRUST. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, ETC. 
Utah Code Ann. §7 5-3-1001. Formal proceedings termin-
ating administration - Testate or Intestate - Order of general 
protection. 
(1) A personal representative or any interested person 
may petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate. 
The personal representative may petition at any time, and any 
other interested person may petition after one year from the 
appointment of the original personal representative except that no 
petition under this section may be entertained until the time for 
presenting claims which arose prior to the death of the 
decedent has expired. The petition may request the court to 
determine testacy, if not previously determined, to consider the 
final account or compel or approve an accounting and distribution, 
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to construe any will or determine heirs, and to adjudicate the 
final settlement and distribution of the estate. After notice to 
all interested persons and hearing the court may enter an order or 
orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons 
entitled to distribution of the estate, and, as circumstances 
require, approving settlement and directing or approving 
distribution of the estate and discharging the personal 
representative from further claim or demand of any interested 
person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from an Order (R. 1347-52) 
(see Exhibit "'A11 in Addendum) granting defendant-respondent, Zions 
First National Bank's ("Zions") motion for partial summary 
judgment. This lawsuit arises from disputes over Zions handling 
of fiduciary duties in connection with the Jerome B. Pepper 
Estate. 
The Third Judicial District Court heard argument in this 
matter on May 6, 1985 and June 10, 1985 and entered the Order from 
which appellants appeal on July 5, 1985. The Order dismissed 
plaintiffs1 first and second causes of action. The Court made 
that Order final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 15,1975, Jerome B. Pepper created an inter vivos 
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trust and appointed Zions trustee. That trust was for the benefit 
of Mr. Pepper's wife and children. Mr. Pepper's will left most of 
his assets to that trust. His will also appointed Zions personal 
representative of his estate. Jerome B. Pepper died on January 
18, 1976 (R. 176-177). 
Zions did not close the Pepper estate until October 8, 
1981. On that date the probate court entered an order granting 
Zions petition for approval of the only formal accounting Zions 
ever prepared in connection with its stewardship of the Pepper 
estate (R. 1313-26). Plaintiffs did not appear at the hearing on 
Zions petition for approval of the first and final accounting (R. 
1322). Zions filed that petition both as personal representative 
of the Jerome B. Pepper estate and in its capacity as trustee of 
the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust. In the latter capacity, 
it only sought approval of a sales agreement it had entered into 
as trustee and of its disposition of the proceeds from that sale. 
The October 8f 1981 order approved those acts but did not purport 
to release the trustee from liability for any other acts or 
omissions (R. 1324-25). 
According to the allegations of plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint (R. 175-200), which the trial court had to 
accept as true for purposes of ruling on defendant's partial 
summary judgment motion, Zions valued the Pepper estate at 
$2,404,839 in an application for credit on January 28, 1980 (R. 
182). Nonetheless, Zions' petition for approval of the first and 
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final accounting asserts that, on September 22, 1981, the estate 
had only liabilities to pass on to the Jerome B. Pepper inter 
vivos trust (R. 1314). Plaintiffs have alleged that this 
discrepancy arose because Zions dissipated the assets of the 
Pepper estate during its tenure as personal representative through 
negligence, fraud and self dealing. Plaintiffs1 original 
complaint, which they filed on April 6, 1982 (R. 2-21), asserted a 
number of claims against Zions as personal representative based on 
those allegations. 
On May 7, 1982, Zions moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that the October 8, 1981 probate court order approving the first 
and final accounting ("the October 8, 1981 order") (see Exhibit 
"B" in Addendum) barred any subsequent claims against the personal 
representative. The court held that the October 8, 1981 order 
barred all claims against the personal representative unless the 
complaint alleged fraud. It also found that plaintiffs1 complaint 
did not allege fraud with sufficient particularity. By an order 
dated June 23, 1982 (R. 64-66), the court dismissed plaintiffs' 
complaint with leave to amend so as to allege fraud adequately. 
Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to allege properly that 
Zions as personal representative had committed fraud. Their fraud 
claims are asserted in the first cause of action of the Second 
Amended Complaint (R. 185-88). 
Plaintiffs have also asserted a claim against Zions in 
its capacity as trustee. That claim is stated in the second cause 
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of action of the Second Amended Complaint (R. 188-92). It is 
based on the trustee's failure to prevent entry of the October 8, 
1981 order. Plaintiffs maintain that the trustee had a duty to 
preserve and pursue any claims against the personal representative 
for dissipating the assets that Jerome B. Pepper's will earmarked 
for the trust. Objecting to the first and final accounting and 
preventing discharge of the personal representative may have been 
a prerequisite to pursuing some such claims. Plaintiffs assert 
that Zions, having failed in its duty to prevent entry of the 
October 8, 1981, order should be liable for the loss of any claims 
against the personal representative that are barred as a result of 
that order. 
On April 15, 1985, Zions filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment seeking dismissal of "any part of plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint which questions alleged actions or 
omissions of Zions which were approved pursuant to the October 8, 
1981 Order" (R. 1153). Zions asserted that all such parts of 
plaintiffs' complaint, including plaintiffs' claims for fraud 
against the personal representative and plaintiffs' claim against 
the trustee for failure to object to the first and final 
accounting, were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. By an 
order dated July 5, 1985 (R. 1347-52), the court granted Zions 
motion and dismissed plaintiffs' first and second causes of 
action. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's conclusion that the October 8, 1981 
order barred claims for fraud against Zions as personal 
representative and claims against Zions as trustee for failure to 
object to entry of that order is erroneous. Its July 5, 1985 
order granting Zions1 motion for partial summary judgment should 
therefore be reversed. 
Several cases from other jurisdictions hold that claims 
for fraud against a personal representative survive an order 
discharging him. No other conclusion is consistent with the 
purpose of the Uniform Probate Code. The legislature did not 
conceive probate proceedings as a shelter for the fraudulent 
behavior of a personal representative. 
Even if plaintiffs1 fraud claims are barred, the October 
8, 1981 order cannot bar a claim against the trustee for failure 
to prevent entry of that order and preserve claims against the 
personal representative. The October 8, 1981 order does not 
purport to decide whether the trustee breached its duty to 
preserve and pursue claims against the personal representative. 
Moreover, a claim for breaching that duty by failing to prevent 
the entry of the October 8, 1981 order could not mature until 
after that order was entered. It could not therefore have been 
adjudicated in the proceedings leading up to that order. Since 
plaintiffs1 claim against Zions as trustee neither was nor could 
have been decided by the October 8, 1981 order, that order cannot 
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bar plaintiffs1 claim, 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE COORT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROBATE 
COURT ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS 
AGAINST ZIONS FOR FRAUD COMMITTED IN ITS CAPACITY 
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THAT ESTATE 
Claims against a personal representative for fraud are 
outside the scope of matters determined in a proceeding to close 
an estate. Such claims cannot therefore be barred by an order 
closing an estate and discharging the personal representative. 
The holding of the court below that plaintiffs1 claims against 
Zions for fraud are barred is erroneous and should be reversed. 
Zions relies on Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1001(1) (1953) to 
establish that the Uniform Probate Code permits a personal 
representative to shield itself from liability for fraud by 
obtaining an order settling the estate. That section does provide 
that such an order discharges "the personal representative from 
further claim or demand of any interested person." It should not, 
however, be construed to offer a personal representative refuge 
from any liability when it has betrayed its fiduciary responsibil-
ities by committing fraud. 
Section 75-3-1001(1) was designed to ease the distri-
bution of estates by requiring all persons with claims against the 
estate to present them for adjudication at a certain time. It was 
not designed to permit a personal representative to defraud the 
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estate with impunity. 
If this Court adopts the interpretation of §75-3-1001(1) 
that Zions has espoused it will place an unconscionable burden on 
the beneficiaries of an estate. The beneficiaries would have to 
determine whether the personal representative has performed his 
duties without absolute integrity before the court enters an order 
closing the estate. This would give rise to a contest of wits 
between a dishonest personal representative and the beneficiaries 
of the estate to whom he owes a fiduciary duty. In that contest, 
the personal representative has all the advantages. He controls 
the flow of information. The beneficiaries may never have any 
reason to suspect foul play. 
Zions1 interpretation of §75-3-1001(1) would maximize the 
beneficiaries1 risk of loss due to a personal representative's 
fraud. At the same time it would minimize a dishonest personal 
representative's risk of liability. The legislature could not 
have intended this result. The law should be construed to protect 
the beneficiaries rather than a fiduciary who betrayed his trust. 
See Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126, 
129 (19 66) ("When a fiduciary deals for his own interest with the 
beneficiary, in case any question arises, such dealings should be 
scrutinized with great care, and the burden is upon him to show 
good faith.") . 
A number of courts from other jurisdictions have construed 
the law to protect beneficiaries by holding that an order closing 
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an estate and discharging the personal representative does not bar 
an action against the personal representative for fraud committed 
in performing its fiduciary responsibilities. Smith v. McMahon, 
236 Or. 310f 388 P.2d 280 (1964)f is one case on point. 
In Smithy the plaintiff filed suit to compel the executor 
of the estate of Mrs. Josephine Ross to return property Mrs. Ross 
had given him prior to her death. The court had approved the 
executor's final accounting in connection with Mrs. Ross1 estate 
before plaintiffs had commenced their action. As in this case, 
defendant urged that the order approving the accounting barred the 
issues plaintiffs sought to litigate. The court rejected that 
argument. It said that the order approving the final accounting 
"was not determinative as to any of the issues presented in this 
suit." Smith, 388 P.2d at 282. 
Hutchings v. Louisville, 276 S.W. 2d 461 (Ky. 1954), is 
also relevant. That case involved a judicially supervised trust. 
In 1930, the court discharged the trustee and approved distri-
bution of the trust corpus. In 1944, plaintiffs sued to recover 
damages from the trustee for self dealing and to obtain an 
accounting. Defendant raised res judicata as a defense to that 
action. The court rejected that defense, holding that the 1930 
order was not conclusive as to fraudulent self dealing: 
It was the duty of the defendant to disclose 
all of the material facts that would put the 
beneficiary on notice that a breach of trust 
had been committed.... This they did not do 
and consequently, plaintiffs are not 
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precluded from now asking the defendant to 
account for its self dealing.... 
Id. at 465. See also Parker v. Rogersony 33 A.D. 2d 284, 307 
N.Y.S. 2d 968, 994 (1970) ("[S]ince [plaintiff]... alleges that 
the facts in the prior proceeding were misrepresented, the decree 
cannot be res judicata.11). 
This Court should follow the approach these cases suggest 
and hold that the October 8, 1981 Order does not bar plaintiffs' 
claims for fraud. 
Point II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
OCTOBER 8, 1981 ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER 
ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST ZIONS 
FOR BREACH OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS TRUSTEE 
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER INTER VIVOS TRUST 
Plaintiffs have alleged that Zions breached its fiduciary 
duty as trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust by 
failing to make any objection to the personal representative's 
first and final accounting, thus permitting entry of the October 
8, 1981 order. It is widely recognized that such a breach of duty 
is actionable: 
A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries 
to take reasonable steps to realize on claims 
which he holds in trust. If he fails to take 
such steps as are reasonable, he is subject to 
surcharge for such losses as result from his 
failure to act.... He is subject to surcharge 
if he does not take reasonable steps to enforce 
a claim against predecessor trustees or against 
the executors, to compel them to transfer 
property to him or to redress a breach of trust 
committed by them. 
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2 Scott on Trusts §177 at 4-1425 (3d ed. 1967). See also Bogert, 
Trusts and Trusteesy §583 (2d ed. 1980). 
A trustee's duty to pursue claims against the personal 
representative that preceded the trustee in control of the trust 
assets does not change merely because the trustee and the personal 
representative are the same entity. In such a situation, the 
trustee is liable if it fails to preserve and pursue a claim 
against itself. See, e.g., Matter of Irrevocable Intervivos Trust 
of R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W. 2d 755, 762 (Minn. 1981) ("The fact that 
a bank serves in a dual capacity, and as trustee may have to 
question its own conduct as executor, does not alter the trustee's 
duty to its beneficiaries."); Estate of Beach v. Carter, 15 Cal. 
3d 623, 542 P.2d 994, 1003, 125 Cal. Reptr. 570 (1975) ("The 
present bank's powers and duties as executor were just as distinct 
from its powers and duties as trustee as if the will had named 
another bank as trustee."). 
The lower court's order of partial summary judgment 
deprived plaintiffs of a hearing on the merits of their claim 
against Zions as trustee. That order concluded that plaintiffs1 
claim against the trustee is barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata as a result of the preclusive effect of the October 8, 
1981 order. 
A court should be reluctant to reach that conclusion in 
this case. Mr. Pepper, knowing that after his death his wife and 
family would need economic protection, hired a professional 
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trustee to guard his estate for their benefit. Zions betrayed his 
trust by choosing to enhance its profit and protect itself rather 
than the Pepper family. Is it equitable to shield a trustee from 
liability in this situation? Since nothing in the doctrine of res 
judicata compels that result here the order dismissing plaintiffs1 
second cause of action should be reversed. 
Res judicata has two branches: Issue preclusion and 
claim preclusion. See Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 
873 (Utah 1983). Neither branch of res judicata should prevent 
plaintiffs from presenting the merits of their claim against the 
trustee. 
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of an issue that was 
"actually litigated and determined" in an earlier proceeding on a 
different cause of action. See Penrod, supra; Restatement (2d) of 
Judgments §27. No issue can be "actually litigated and deter-
mined" against a litigant for purposes of issue preclusion unless 
the litigant appears and presents argument on that issue. Thus, 
for example, a litigant who defaulted in one proceeding cannot, as 
a result, be subject to issue preclusion in a later proceeding. 
Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 789 (3rd Cir. 1978); International 
Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979). The Restatement 
(2d) of Judgments §27, Comment (e), makes this point succinctly: 
"A judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues 
which might have been but were not litigated and determined in the 
prior action.... In the case of a judgment entered by confession, 
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consent, or default, none of the issues is actually litigated." 
Plaintiffs did not appear in the proceeding that led to 
the October 8, 1981 order. The probate court's conclusions rested 
exclusively on Zions' self-serving statements. Since nothing was 
contested before the probate court, nothing was "actually 
litigated and determined" there. For issue preclusion purposes, 
the October 8, 1981 order was exactly analagous to a default 
judgment. Like a default judgment, that order cannot give rise to 
any issue preclusion. 
Zions has argued that the October 8, 1981 Order repre-
sents a judicial determination that Zions did nothing wrong as 
personal representative of the Pepper estate. According to Zions, 
it follows that plaintiffs are barred from litigating their claim 
against the trustee because that claim presupposes the personal 
representative breached its fiduciary duties (R. 1304-05). This 
argument seems to rely on issue preclusion. Since there can be no 
issue preclusion as a result of the October 8, 1981 order, that 
reliance is misplaced. 
The concept of claim preclusion is equally useless as 
support for the argument that res judicata bars plaintiffs claim 
against the trustee. Claim preclusion bars relitigation of claims 
which are within the scope of a valid judgment in an earlier 
action, even if the barred claim was not actually litigated in the 
earlier action. A claim cannot be within the scope of an earlier 
judgment and subject to claim preclusion unless that claim either 
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was or could have been determined in the proceeding that led to 
the earlier judgment. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 
(1980); Penrod , supra at 875. 
The October 8, 1981 order did not adjudicate plaintiffs1 
claims against the trustee. It only mentions the trustee to 
approve one specified transaction. Moreover, plaintiffs1 claim 
against Zions as trustee could not have been determined at the 
hearing on Zions petition for approval of the first and final 
accounting. 
Plaintiffs could not have asserted their claim against 
the trustee in the proceeding that led to the October 8, 1981 
order because their claim was not ripe until after that order was 
entered. Plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee is based on the 
trustee1s failure to object to the first and final accounting. 
That omission injured plaintiffs because it permitted entry of the 
October 8, 1981 order which may bar some of plaintiffs1 claims 
against the personal representative. Plaintiffs suffered no 
injury from the trustee's breach of duty until the court entered 
the October 8, 1981 order. Assertion of plaintiffs1 claim against 
the trustee would have been premature before they suffered that 
injury. They could not, therefore, have asserted their claim 
against the trustee in the proceedings that led to the October 8, 
1981 order. Since they could not have done so then, claim 
preclusion cannot bar them from doing so now. 
If this Court holds that the October 8, 1981 order bars 
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plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee, it will permit Zions 
simultaneously to breach its fiduciary duties as trustee and to 
shield itself from liability for that breach. Such a result would 
make Zions' responsibilities as trustee meaningless, since no 
action to enforce those responsibilities would ever have been 
possible. Zions voluntarily undertook those responsibilities and 
received payment for doing so. It should be liable for its 
failure to discharge them. Res judicata cannot bar a claim for 
injury at the very moment the injury occurs without violating 
fundamental notions of fairness. 
Although plaintiffs have found no Utah authority directly 
on point, a number of appellate courts in other jurisdictions have 
considered the narrow issue presented here: Does the liability of 
a trustee for failure to pursue a claim against itself as personal 
representative survive an order discharging the personal represent-
ative? As far as plaintiffs have been able to determine, every 
appellate decision on that issue in the last forty-seven years has 
determined that it does. See Matter of Irrevocable Intervivos 
Trust of R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W. 2d 755 (Minn. 1981)? In Re First 
National Bank, 37 Ohio St. 2d 60, 307 N.E. 2d 23 (1974); Matter of 
Estate of Winston, 99 111. App. 3d 278, 425 N.E. 2d 973 (111. App. 
1981); Liska v. First National Bank, 310 N.W. 2d 531 (Iowa App. 
1981); Bullis v. DuPage Trust Co., 73 111. App. 927, 391 N.E. 2d 
227 (1979). 
The defendant bank in Kemske was both executor of Rudolf 
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Kemske's estate and trustee of a trust which was the "primary 
legatee" of Mr. Kemske's estate. 305 N.W. 2d at 761. The probate 
court had approved a final decree of distribution more than two 
years before the Kemske suit was filed. The trial court refused 
to hear evidence as to the bank's mismanagement of the estate 
believing that the order approving the final accounting barred 
any claims based on such evidence. The court persisted in that 
view even though plaintiffs argued that the bank should be held 
liable as trustee for failing to object to the final account that 
the bank filed in its capacity as executor. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court reversed. 
On appeal, the defendant bank made the same argument 
Zions puts forward. It urged that the probate court order 
approving its final account as executor conclusively established 
that there was no reason for the trustee to object to that 
account. Kemske, 305 N.W. 2d at 763. The court rejected this 
argument: 
This is not a collateral attack on a probate 
court order. It is a claim of breach of a 
trustee's duty to its beneficiaries, not breach 
of an executor's duty to its legatees. 
...At the hearing on the final account, the 
trustee—acting for the trust beneficiaries— 
owed the beneficiaries a duty to use reasonable 
care and diligence in examining that accounting 
and objecting thereto if reasonable and prudent 
to do so.... [I]t was error not to have 
permitted appellants...to introduce evidence of 
the executor's performance as bearing on the 
trustee's duty of care. 
-16-
IcL at 762-63. 
In Re First National Bank, 37 Ohio St. 2d 60, 307 N.E. 2d 
23 (1974), reached a similar conclusion. There the defendant bank 
was executor of an estate and trustee of a testamentary trust 
created to receive assets of the estate. The executor overpaid 
more than $5,000 in inheritance taxes. Five years after the court 
approved a final accounting, plaintiffs sued the bank in its 
capacity as trustee seeking damages for the overpayment. Plaintiffs 
based their claim on the theory that the bank as trustee had 
failed to pursue a claim against itself as executor to recover the 
tax overpayment. The trial court held that the plaintiffs1 claim 
was barred by the order approving the bank's final accounting. 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bank as trustee 
had a duty to preserve the trust assets and that a claim for 
breach of that duty was not barred by discharge of the bank as 
executor. 
Matter of the Estate of Winston, 99 111. App. 3d 278, 425 
N.E. 2d 973 (1981), is another case which is directly on point. 
There, a decedent's widow acted as both administratrix of his 
estate and as trustee of a trust which was to receive certain 
assets under his will. More than seven years after the court 
approved the widow's final account as administratrix, one of the 
beneficiaries of the trust sued, alleging that she had converted 
some of the assets from her husband's estate that should have been 
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placed into the trust. The court rejected the argument that the 
order approving the widow's final accounting barred the suit: 
As trusteef she had a duty to assure that any 
assets rightfully belonging to the trust became 
part of the trust.... As trustee, it was 
incumbent upon her to challenge the final 
account if she knew or should have known that 
[certain stock she retained] constituted part of 
the residue of [the estate] and thus part of the 
trust. [She] cannot now assert the binding 
effect of the order approving the final account 
obtained...in her capacity as administratrix to 
escape accountability for...breach of her 
fiduciary duty as trustee in failing to 
challenge the final account. 
Winston, 425 N.E. 2d 980-81. The Liska and Bullis cases cited 
above reach similar conclusions in precisely the same situation. 
See also Succession of Tolmasf 439 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 1983). 
The only authority that contradicts these cases is both 
old and poorly reasoned. See Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal. 2d 
366, 79 P.2d 1096 (1938); Annot., 116 ALR 1290 (1938). The Carr 
case is the strongest and most recent such authority. Carr was a 
suit against a bank that was both executor of an estate and 
trustee of a trust that succeeded to the assets of the estate 
after it was closed. The plaintiffs brought suit after the court 
had discharged the bank as executor. They alleged that the 
executor had managed the estate negligently and that the trustee 
was liable for failing to pursue a claim against the executor for 
that negligence. The court held that the order releasing the 
defendant as executor barred the suit against it as trustee. 
This holding is based on a fundamental misconception 
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about res judicata. In support of its holding the Carr court 
stated: 
[T]he court's negative determination of the 
issue of the bank's liability as executor upon 
the ground of negligence and fraud, of 
necessity, settles that issue when the question 
of the bank's negligence and fraud as executor 
is brought into question in an attempt to charge 
the bank as trustee. 
7 9 P.2d at 1101. This statement does not accurately reflect the 
law concerning issue preclusion. A court's determination of an 
issue in an uncontested proceeding does not bar litigation of that 
issue in a subsequent action between the same parties on a 
different claim. See Restatement (2d) of Judgments §27. The 
Carr court's failure to grasp this principle may explain why no 
other court has followed Carr in the forty-seven years since it 
was decided. This court should not be the first to do so. 
In sum, both analysis of res judicata and the over-
whelming weight of relevant authority indicate that the October 8, 
1981 order approving Zions first and final accounting as personal 
representative of the Jerome B. Pepper estate does not bar 
plaintiffs' claim against Zions as trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper 
inter vivos trust. The scant authority to the contrary is poorly 
reasoned. Plaintiffs should therefore be permitted to assert 
their second cause of action against the trustee. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's order of partial summary judgment dated 
July 5, 1985 should be reversed and this matter should be remanded 
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for presentation of the merits of all plaintiffs' claims. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of November, 1985. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
J. Peter Mulhern, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is*employed in the office of Biele, Haslam & 
Hatch, attorneys for appellants. 
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of 
Appellants1 Brief upon the parties to the within described action 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of;November, 1985. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12th day of 
November, 1985. 
WOTARY P UBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
7-fr-Eff 
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ADDENDUM 
Order of Partial Summary Judgment 
Order Approving First and Final Account, Approving Final 
Settlement and Distribution; and Ratifying and Approving Acts 
Including Sale of Interest in Business. 
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CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
GARY R. HOWE (A1552) 
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283) 
JEFFREY L. SHIELDS (A2947) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 531-7676 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions First National Bank 
&C?M,h. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
PHILIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona 
resident, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N.A. et al. , 
Defendant 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N.A. , 
Third Party Defendant, 
vs 
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada 
resident, et al., 
Third Party Defendant, 
ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
(Honorable James S. Sawaya) 
Civil No. C-82-2779 
* * * * * * * 
The motion of Zions First National Bank ("Zions") for 
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings or in the alternative, for 
Partial Summary Judgment came before the Court, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya presiding, on the 6th day of May, 1985 at 2:00 
p.m. Charles M. Bennett, Gary R. Howe and Jeffrey L. Shields, 
of and for Callister & Nebeker, appeared on behalf of 
defendant, Zions First National Bank. Edward S. Sweeney and J. 
Peter Mulhern, of and for Biele, Haslam & Hatch, appeared on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, Phillip C. Pepper, guardian and 
conservator of Fannie N. Pepper, Phillip C. Pepper and Frances 
T. Morgan. H. Michael Keller, of and for VanCott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, appeared on behalf of third party 
defendants, Charles H. Foote and Fox & Co. Bernard L. Rose 
appeared on behalf of third party defendant, Fred M. Rosenthal. 
The Court heard the argument of Mr. Bennett in favor of the 
motion and the argument of Mr. Mulhern and Mr. Sweeney in 
opposition to the motion. No other parties argued the motion. 
The Court also considered the memoranda of counsel on the 
motion. Thus, having been fully advised in the premises, the 
Court entered its minute entry of May 6th, 1985 granting Zions' 
motion. 
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Thereafter, Zions submitted a proposed order pursuant to 
Rule 2.9 and plaintiffs filed their objection to the scope of 
the proposed order. Memoranda was submitted by plaintiffs and 
Zions in support of their respective positions. A hearing was 
held on June 10, 1985 at 2:00 p.m. and the Court heard the 
argument of counsel. Thus, having been fully advised in the 
matter, the Court finds and rules as follows: 
1. The plaintiffs have expressly chosen not to seek to 
set aside or vacate the order of the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
in Probate No. 62746, the Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, dated 
October 8, 1981 (the "October 8, 1981 Order"). 
2. Accordingly, the October 8, 1981 Order remains res 
judicata as to all of plaintiffs' claims against Zions First 
National Bank which fall within the purview of the October 8, 
1981 Order. 
3. All of the plaintiffs' claims in their first cause of 
action (paragraphs 50 through 69 of the plaintiffs1 Second 
Amended Complaint, dated December 7, 1982) fall within the 
purview of the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed. 
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4. All of the plaintiffs' claims in their second cause of 
action (paragraphs 70 through 86) fall within the purview of 
the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed. 
5. Paragraphs 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs' fifth 
cause of action fall within the purview of the October 8, 1981 
Order and should be dismissed. 
6. Since there is not just reason for further delay and 
since this Order constitutes a final order as to plaintiffs' 
first and second causes of action (and related parts of 
plaintiffs' fifth cause of action) it is proper for this Order 
to issue pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered: 
1. All of plaintiffs' claims which fall within the 
purview of the October 8, 1981 Order are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. Those claims are encompassed in paragraphs 50 
through 69. 70 through 86, 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint, dated December 7. 1982. 
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2. This Order shall constitute a final order pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) . 
ED: f#va*/ ? . DAT :/ 1985. 
CN2289B 
By The Court: 
TJirB Honorable James S.Sawaya 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINOLEY 
Cterk 
Q^W_/\ ,' » r
 lf 7 — ^ / ^ * » A ^ j 
Deputy Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage 
fully prepaid this 18th day of June, 1985, to the following: 
John S. Chindlund, Esq. 
James A. Boevers, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
424 East Fifth South, Third Floor 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Leslie L. Miller, Esq. 
10 Luhr Arcade 
11 West Jefferson 
Phoenix, Arizona 85003 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr., Esq. 
HUGHES & JOHNS 
2411 Kiesel Avenue, Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Bernard L. Rose, Esq. 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq. 
H. Michael Keller, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Edward S. Sweeney, Esq. 
J. Peter Mulhern, Esq. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
l ARRVLI - HALL of 
i m Q\ INNEY ^ \CBEKER 
t t c n c n : r DI b t o to of J e r o m e B F ' p p p * - , D e c e a s e d 
400 D e s p r e t B n l d i n g 
> a l t L3ke C i t y U t a h 8*111 
l e l e p h o n n 5 3 2 - 1 5 0 0 
I r n c i n l R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LM<1 COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the iat'er of thp Estate of 
JCRO F 0 PEPPER, 
Deceased 
ORDER APPROVING FIRST AND 
FINAL ACCOUNT, APPROVING 
TINAL SETTLEMENT >\ND 
DISTRIBUTION AND RATIEY-
ING AND APP>-0/ING 
ACTS INCLUDING SALE OF 
INTERIST IN BUSINESS. 
Probate No. 62746 
The petition of Zions First National Bank for approval of 
rust and r m a 1 Account for final settlement and distribution for 
atification and approval of acts including saJe of interest in 
business coming on regularly to be heard, it appearing Lo the 
Cour4" that du<= and legal notice has be^n given to all interested 
parties a^ required by law, and no person appearing in opposition 
tnerelo, the Court finds 
1 The above named decedent died on Januaiy 18, 1976, a 
o
^idon of Salt Take County State of Utah and thereafter 
^-»tit oier .as duly appointed and is now the qualified and actma 
r pisoml 7 [ rps^ntativ*3 of the estate of said decedent 
2 Pelition^r, as the personal representative of the 
i°cpd^nt h s collated and managed the assrts of the ostat^ has 
L led ~m m e U o ^ herein has published notice to creditors has 
OJIO ill la ful claims of the decedent's cieditors against thr» 
^G'aie o^c^Dt for two clans as explained in paragrapn 3 below 
has ^l^clcd *o pay a portion the federal estate tax determined lo 
)e o <~J b> tie estate in the amount of $283 891 AO in installments 
( ^[ hich $91 6S8 00 remains unoaid) has obtained consent ^C thn 
State Tax Commjssion to pay a portion of the Utah Inheritance Tax 
of $157,830.00 in installments over a five-year period (of which 
$46,698.00 remains unpaid); and has performed all acts required of 
a Personal Representative by the laws of this state pertaining to 
estates of decedents. 
3. The time for presenting claims which arose prior to 
the death of the decedent has expired, all claims except for a 
pledge to Congregation Kol Ami, (which petitioner has arranged to 
pay in installments) and a claim of Peppers Allied Metals Company 
which will be settled in the course of liquidation of the latter 
coiporation, have been paid; and there are no contingent, unliqui-
dated or future claims against the estate. There is no necessity 
to further delay distribution of the estate until the remaining 
claims, Utah inheritance tax and Federal Estate Tax have been paid 
in full. The assets remaining in the estate are not sufficient to 
pay said remaining obligations in any event. The petitioner, in 
its capacity as Trustee under a trust agreement entered into with 
the decedent, Jerome B. Pepper, on April 15, 1975 (during his 
lifetime), is the sole devisee and beneficiary of all of the 
rest, residue and remainder of the estate properties. The 
remaining death tax and pledge installment obligations should be 
paid by Petitioner out of trusts created under said agreement. 
Petitioner, as such Trustee, therefore, hereby assumes said 
obligations of the estate. The $427,036.34 open account balance 
owed to Peppers Allied Metals Company (a corporation controlled by 
the estate, which is presently in liquidation) is partially offset 
by a payable from said corporation to the trust as set forth in 
paragraph 8 below. 
4. Petitioner has filed its first and final accounting 
of its administration of this estate. Said accounting, consisting 
of a summary and schedules 1 through 11C, is attached to the 
petition as Exhibit A and by reference made a part hereof. 
A<r shown on schedules 7A and 8 of said accounting, on 
18th day o f M a y' 1 9 8 1' petitioner, in its capacity as Personal 
sentative, distributed to itself, in its capacity as Trustee 
nder said agreement dated April 15, 1975 the decedent's interest 
a S a co-venturer in the Learner-Pepper Company. 
6. On the 28th day of May, 1981, Petitioner, in its 
capacity as such Trustee, entered into an agreement, as Seller, 
with Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., a Massachusetts Corporation, 
as Buyer, for sale to the Buyer of decedent's interest in the 
Learner-Pepper Company for $1,000,000. The sale price is subject 
to adjustment to reflect additional facts, if any, disclosed by an 
audit of the books of Learner-Pepper Company pursuant to the Joint 
Venture Purchase Agreement executed by the parties to said sale, a 
copy of which is attached to the petition as Exhibit B and by 
reference made a part thereof. All adult beneficiaries of said 
trust consented in writing to said sale. Copies of their consents 
are attached to the petition as Exhibits C-l through C-5 inclusive 
and are by reference made a part thereof. 
7. On the 22nd day of April, 1981, Petitioner, in its 
capacity as Personal Representative, on behalf of the Estate as 
controlling shareholder of Peppers Allied Metals Company, a Utah 
Corporation, together with the other shareholders, caused said 
company to adopt a plan of liquidation, a copy of which is 
attached to the petition as Exhibit D and by reference made a part 
thereof. in accordance with said plan of liquidation and under 
Petitioner's direction, the officers of Pepper Allied Metals 
Company, on May 28, 1981, caused that company, as Seller, to sell 
to Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., as Buyer, all of the fixed 
assets of its Ogden, Utah, scrap metals recycling operation for 
$88,352.00, pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement, a copy of 
which is attached to the petition as Exhibit E and by reference 
made a part thereof. 
RAY f j U I N N E Y b> NEBEKCR 
*'f> l \ n i i l Building 
SALT L i t O T , 
8. In connection with the sale transactions described in 
F>«Jr ag caphs 6 and 7 above, Petitioner, in its capacity as Trustee, 
u
'-°d a portion oC the proceeds of the sale of the Learner-Pepper 
Company Joint Venture interest to purchase, from the Utah Copper 
division, Kennecott Metals Company, a debt of Peppers Allied 
Mctols Company in the amount of $225,019.36, and from Teledyne 
Notional, a debt of Peppers Allied Metals Company in the amount of 
S?4,356.22. Purchase of these obligations was required by Hugo 
Ncu Steel Products, Inc., the Buyer, as a condition to closing the 
sales transactions. Copies of two checks drawn by Petitioner on 
raid Trust account to the respective Assignors of said debts are 
attached to the petition as Exhibit "F" which is by reference made 
a part thereof. 
9. Petitioner's accounting should be approved, and 
all of petitioner's acts in the administration of the estate, 
including those described in paragraphs 5 and 7 above, should be 
ratified and approved. 
10. Those acts of petitioner performed, in its capacity 
as Trustee in its administration of said Trust, which are 
described in paragraphs 6 and 8 above should be ratified and 
approved. 
THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 
a. The final account of petitioner which is 
attached to the petition, together with all 
acts of petitioner in the administration of the 
estate be and are hereby approved and ratified;^ 
petitioner be and is hereby authorized and 
directed to distribute and transfer title to 
the assets of the estate to petitioner as 
Trustee^under said Trust Agreement dated April 
15, 1975, to be held, administered and 
distributed in accordance with the provisions 
of said Trust Agreement, and, after petitioner 
has made such final settlement and distribution 
and has filed petitioner's receipts herein, 
petitioner shall be discharged and the 
administration of this estate closed. 
b. The acts of petitioner performed in 
administering said trust which are described 
herein be and are hereby ratified and approved. 
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Petitioner as Trustee be and is hereby 
authorized and directed to pay the remaining 
pledge obligation, the Federal Estate Tax and 
Utah Inheritance Tax obligations and any 
remaining balance of the Peppers Allied Metals 
Comp"aTT7 open account not otherwise disposed of 
in the course of liquidation of that corpora-
tion out of the Trusts created under said Trust 
Agreement dated April 15, 1975. 
DATED t h i s 
A T T E S T 
W STERLING EVANS 
Clerk 
f day of S&/JS/<_ , 1 9 8 1 . THE COURT 
^2ik 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
a 
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